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Abstract
Theory suggests that a close match between revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels
beneﬁts allocative efﬁciency, and hence economic growth. That is, a convergence of revenue and
expenditure assignments at sub-national levels of government should, according to the theory, be positively
associated with a higher growth rate. In the case of China, this paper shows, divergence, rather than
convergence, in revenue and expenditures at the sub-national level of government is associated with higher
rates of growth. A panel dataset for 30 provinces in China is used to examine the relationship between ﬁscal
decentralization and economic growth over two phases of ﬁscal decentralization in China: (1) 1979–1993
under the ﬁscal contract system, and (2) 1994–1999 under the tax assignment system. The seeming
contradiction between the theory and evidence in the China case is reconciled by taking into account the
institutional arrangements that prevailed during the two phases of ﬁscal decentralization, in particular the
inconsistency between the assumptions of the theory of ﬁscal decentralization and the institutional realityof
China.
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Since initiating economic reforms in 1978, ﬁscal decentralization has been a central
component of China’s economic policy at a time when China has experienced unprecedented
economic growth. Although China remains a unitary political system, where sub-national
governmentelectionsarevirtuallynotexist,its ﬁscalsystemisneverthelessa decentralizedone
featured by a ﬁscal contract system (1980–1993)
1 and revenue assignment system (1994–
present). Regardless of China’s non-democratic institutions, the beneﬁts of ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion seem still applicable, according to Oates (1972, p. xvi), because ‘‘for an economist,
however,constitutionalandpoliticalstructuresareoflessimportance:Whatiscrucialforhimis
simply that different levels of decision-making do exist, each of which determines levels of
provision of particular public services in response largely to the interests of its geographical
constituency. By this deﬁnition, practically any ﬁscal system is federal or at least possesses
federal elements’’.
The question of whether ﬁscal decentralization has contributed to China’s economic success
over the past 20 years is, however, open to debate. Some argue that ﬁscal decentralization has
been fundamental to China’s economic success (Oi, 1992; Qian, 1999; Qian & Weingast, 1997).
It has been asserted that the ﬁscal contract system (1980–1993) provided material incentives that
encouraged and rewarded sub-national governments to promote local economies (Oi, 1992;
Qian, 1999). Secondly, Qian (1999) assumes that sub-national governments had less control over
banksandthereforecouldnotbailouttheirstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs)byextendingcreditto
them as the central government did. Fiscal decentralization, they argue, hardened the budget
constraints of sub-national governments’ SOEs, and thus made these SOEs more efﬁcient (Qian,
1999). The ﬁscal contract system, it is also asserted, allowed sub-national governments to
conceal information about their ﬁnancial position and enabled them to avoid revenue predation
from the Center (Qian & Weingast, 1997), thus allowing them to retain the ﬁnancial resources
they needed for investments that promoted economic development.
Some studies have, however, offered evidence suggesting that ﬁscal decentralization
fragmented the national market, and hence negatively affected economic growth. Instead of
inducing jurisdictional competition that would have potentially enhanced allocative efﬁciency,
decentralization,itisargued,createdrevenueincentivesthatencouragedsub-nationalgovernments
to engage in protectionist behavior (Yang, 1997). Enterprise ownership by local governments
providedanincentivetolocalgovernmentstoduplicateenterprisesundertheirjurisdictionsoasto
capture the revenues that would have otherwise gone to the central coffers, leading to ‘‘backward
specialization’’,
2 as evidenced by the convergence of regional relative outputs and a divergence of
regionalrelativefactorallocationsandlaborproductivitiesduringthereformera(Young,2000).As
aresult,thecentrallycontrolledplannedeconomydevolved,accordingtothisargument,intooneof
many regional planned economies controlled by sub-national governments (Young, 2000). In
addition, such ownership structure of SOEs enabled sub-national governments increasingly to
mandatetheseﬁrmstoprovidepublicgoods—suchashousing,healthcare,childcare,schoolingand
pension. Thus, it is argued that budget constraint on sub-national governments was effectively
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1 Under ﬁscal contract system, each subnational government level contracted with the next level up to meet certain
revenue remittance targets, which could be either a nominal amount or a percentage share. The retention was at the sole
discretion of subnational governments. For details, see Bahl and Wallich (1992), World Bank (1989, 1993).
2 The term is used by Yang (1997).softened by ﬁscal decentralization, since many local SOEs shared the spending responsibilities of
local governments and became de facto government agencies and conduits for central-local
ﬁnancial transfers (Steinfeld, 1999).
The aim of this paper is to attempt to resolve and reconcile these outstanding issues, as well as
to relate the Chinese experience to the orthodox theory of ﬁscal decentralization. Using panel
dataset for 30 provinces from 1979 to 1993
3 and 1994 to 1999, respectively, this paper
investigatestherelationshipbetweentheprevailingﬁscalpatterns,deﬁnedbybothexpenditureas
well as revenue decentralization at the provincial level, and China’s provincial economic growth.
It further examines how the shift from the contracted revenue sharing (1980–1993) to tax
assignment system (1994–1999) affected the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and
provincial economic growth. It aims to explain how intergovernmental ﬁscal relations under the
two tax regimes affected growth.
Section 2 reviews the theoretical arguments and empirical studies on the relationship between
ﬁscal decentralization and economic growth. Section 3 outlines the hypothesis, explanatory
variables, and methodology used in this case study of ﬁscal decentralization in China. Section 4
reports the regression results and Section 5 summarizes the ﬁndings and conclusions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Theoretical considerations
It has long been held that, in theory, ﬁscal decentralization may be conducive to economic
growth. If few public goods entail nationwide externalities, sub-national governments are likely
to be more efﬁcient in the production and delivery of public goods (Oates, 1972). It is also
asserted that decision-making on expenditures at lower levels of government is more responsive
to diversiﬁed local preferences and needs and, therefore, more conducive to allocative efﬁciency
(Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). Decentralizing revenue discretion to sub-national governments to
match the spending assignments may also enhance accountability (Oates, 1972). It is held,
therefore,thatforagivenlevelofgovernment,revenuemeansshouldmatch expenditureneedsas
closely as possible, thereby (1) stimulating revenue mobilization from local sources, and
improving a country’s overall ﬁscal position; (2) improving accountability of sub-national
governments; and (3) reducing the distorting effects ofintergovernmental transfers (Shah, 1994).
Theorists of ﬁscal decentralization were inspired, for the most part, by their observations of
the functioning of ﬁscal systems based in highly developed economies, like the United States
(Brueckner, 2000). The implications of ﬁscal decentralization in the context of a developing
country are, however, subject to various qualiﬁcations due to the divergence between the
assumptions of orthodox theory and the institutional as well as economic realities in developing
countries. As many have argued, if the standard assumptions of decentralization theory do not
hold, the outcomes of ﬁscal decentralization may be detrimental to economic growth and
efﬁciency (Oates, 1993; Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996; Jin and Zou, 2003).
Prud’homme (1995) stresses, for example, that local provision of public goods may not be
more cost-effective than at the national level because of economies of scale and economies of
scope. It has also been suggested that assuming constituents universally can express their
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all available time series data since 1979.preferences in their votes ignores (1) the patron–client relationships that deﬁne the localelectoral
behavior in developing countries, and (2) the usually vague and inconsistent electoral mandate of
local elections in these countries (Prud’homme, 1995). In addition, even if local constituents can
express preferences in their votes, and the elected ofﬁcials want to satisfy thevoters’ needs, local
bureaucracies that carry out the electoral mandate may be poorly motivated and/or qualiﬁed to
carryout their responsibilities (Prud’homme, 1995).
Fiscal decentralization may also be conducive to corruption at local level because it confers
discretion on local politicians and bureaucrats who are more susceptible and accessible to the
demands of local interest groups (Prud’homme, 1995; Tanzi, 1996). Corruption at sub-national
levels is likely to diminish, if not negate, the beneﬁts that theory suggests ﬁscal decentralization
brings to allocative efﬁciency and growth.
Moreover, in a non-democratic political system, the basic premise that sub-national
governments have a stronger incentive to provided local public goods more efﬁciently may not
apply (Tanzi, 1996). The principle-agent problem in a non-democratic political system may
render ﬁscal decentralization as a tool to be used by sub-national authorities to exploit local
constituents and the national treasury (for the case of China, please refer to Wong, 1991; Bahl &
Wallich, 1992; Bahl, 1999).
2.2. Empirical evidence
The problem with the recent empirical studies can be summarized from the perspectivesof (1)
measurements of ﬁscal decentralization; (2) the relative relationship between expenditure and
revenue decentralization; and (3) levels of government. Firstly, using expenditure shares alone to
measure decentralization tends to produce a negative (for developing countries) or insigniﬁcant
(for industrial countries) relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and economic growth
(Davoodi & Zou, 1998; Xie, Zou, & Davoodi, 1999; Zhang & Zou, 1998).
4 Using revenue shares
alone to measure decentralization tends to give results suggesting a positive relationship with
economic growth (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2001). What accounts for these fundamentally contradictory
results? Perhaps the most important explanation is that expenditure in most of the countries is
typically far more decentralized than revenue. For example, for the six-country sample data for
1999 used in Ebel and Yilmaz (2001), the mean of sub-national expenditure share in total
government revenue is 22%, while the mean of sub-national own-taxes revenue share in total
government revenue is only 6.2%. Since sub-national governments’ own-taxes revenue share in
totalrevenueissubstantiallylowerthantheirexpenditureshareintotalexpenditure,itistherefore
not surprising that using revenue shares alone to measure decentralization tends to give results to
suggest that revenue decentralization (i.e., increasing the share of sub-national tax revenue share
in total government revenue to meet the much larger spending assignments at the corresponding
level) promotes economic growth. As such, neither the positive association between revenue
decentralization and economic growth found in the study by Ebel and Yilmaz (2001) can
undermine or refute the negative(or insigniﬁcant) ﬁndings between expenditure decentralization
and growth found by Davoodi and Zou (1998), Xie et al. (1999), Zhang and Zou (1998), nor vice
versa. Because the later use the expenditure shares, which are much more decentralized than
revenue shares to assess the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and economic growth,
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(1998) is a case study on China.and both studies consider only half of the story. Clearly what is necessary in analyzing the
relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and economic growth is to test simultaneously the
effect of the level of both expenditure and revenue decentralization, and the effect of the ﬁscal
pattern they hence reveal (i.e., the extent to which expenditure and revenue decentralization
converge or diverge), which is the approach taken in this case study of China. What should be
note here is that such observations do not imply to detect the optimal level of expenditure or
revenue decentralization, but about which directions they move. If the regression suggests that
one should move closer to the other, then I call it a convergence. Otherwise divergence.
A second general observation on the recent empirical investigations is that when both
decentralization measures are used, the results should be interpreted with respect not just to the
coefﬁcients of each measure but should also take into account the decentralization on the two
sides of the government budget. In other words, the relationship between expenditure and
revenue decentralization matters. For example, Akai and Sakata (2002) use both state
expenditure and revenue share in total to proxy for ﬁscal decentralization. They conclude that
‘‘ﬁscal decentralization contributes to economic growth’’ because expenditure decentralization
has a positive association with state GDP per capita growth rate in all equations. But a
comparison of the relative levels of expenditure and revenue decentralization at US state level
suggests a different conclusion. Speciﬁcally, since expenditure is 7.5% more decentralized than
revenue at the US state level (see Table 3.A.2 in Akai & Sakata, 2002), to suggest that further
expenditure decentralization promotes growth is to imply that expenditure and revenue
assignments should diverge, rather than converge as the theoretical literature suggests is
conducive to efﬁciency and growth.
Jin and Zou’s (1999) study, using both revenue and expenditure decentralization measures at
bothstate/provincialandlocal levels
5ﬁnd thataconvergence ofrevenueandexpenditureatstate/
provincial level and a divergence of them at local level promote growth. The ﬁnding that growth
is promoted by the convergence of expenditure and revenue at the state/provincial level is
consistent with the theoretical principle of ﬁscal federalism. However, the suggestion for
divergence of the two – more expenditure assignments and fewer revenue assignments – at local
level is not. The intuitive appeal of this result is that tax bases tend to be smaller and narrower at
the local level than at the state/provincial level (Bird, 1992; Mello, 2000). Local governments
simply do not have the social and economic endowments to generate the revenue required to
ﬁnance their spending requirements.
Thepreviouspointleadstoathirdgeneralobservation:Mostcountrieshavethreeormorethan
three levels of government (federal, state and local), howeverthe assignments of expenditure and
revenuemayhavedifferentimplicationsatdifferentsub-nationallevelsofgovernment(e.g.,state
or local). The question is, however, whether the results for one level of government can be
generalized to another. It is well established, for example, that the revenue-generation capacity
varies at different levels of government (Musgrave, 1983). The tax bases of local governments
(vis-a `-visstate/provinciallevel)arerelativelynarrowbecauseofpossibletaxexport,externalities
in the public goods provision, factor mobility, and economies of scale (Mello, 2000). As such,
decentralization of revenue assignments to match local expenditure assignments may not be
efﬁcient or growth promoting, as demonstrated in Jin and Zou (1999).
Finally, it is worth recalling that cross-country studies have the disadvantage of pooling
countries with substantial differences in history, politics, institutions, and culture, which if not
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decentralization and growth (Akai & Sakata, 2002). Speciﬁc country studies, such as the present
one, avoid this problem, though it may be argued that their results are less generalizable.
3. Hypothesis, explanatory variables and methodology
3.1. Hypothesis and explanatory variables
This study uses Chinese provincial panel data for two time periods, 1979–1993 and 1994–
1999, to investigate the effect of ﬁscal reforms on provincial economic growth under the two
ﬁscal regimes: the ﬁscal contract system and the tax assignment regime. The purpose of using
two time periods is to focus on the effect of the policy change of tax structure and collection that
brought by the 1994 reform. Therefore, instead of using tests of structural change to identify the
break of time period, the second period is assigned from 1994, the year when the new tax
assignment implemented with the split of tax collection between the Center and the provinces.
Fiscal decentralization is measured with respect to both expenditure and revenue
assignments. Four ﬁscal decentralization measures are used. The two measures of expenditure
decentralization are (1) provincial budgetary expenditure as a share in total budgetary
expenditure, and (2) provincial extra-budgetary expenditure as a share in total extra-budgetary
expenditure. The two measures of revenue decentralization are (1) provincial budgetary revenue
as a share in total budgetary revenue, and (2) provincial extra-budgetary revenue as a share in
total extra-budgetary revenue. Both provincial expenditure and revenue are expenditures spent
and revenue collected at the provincial level. Using revenue collected at the provincial level as a
share in total revenue to proxy the degree of revenue decentralization has the advantage of
incorporatingthe tax collectionaspect.More speciﬁcally,since China hada completelylocalized
tax administration during the ﬁscal contract phase (1979–1993) – i.e., provinces collected taxes
for the central government as its agents – provincial revenue share in total revenue should be, on
average, larger than provincial expenditure share, the difference being the provinces’remittance
to the Center (rather than central transfer to states/provinces, as is more typically the case).
The 1994 ﬁscal reform replaced localized tax administration by disaggregating tax collection
into central and sub-national parts, with the central tax administration collecting central and
shared taxes and sub-national bureaus collecting local taxes. Since 1995, central to provincial
government transfers are recorded in the budget. In addition to the expenditure and revenue
decentralization measures, the intergovernmental transfer, measured by central transfer to
provinces as a percentage in total provincial expenditure, is taken into account in the analysis for
thesecondphaseoftheﬁscalreformsoastoassessthepotentialdistortingeffectofsuchtransfers
at provincial level.
Conventional ﬁscal decentralization theory holds that the matching of revenue means and
expenditure assignments at sub-national level promotes economic growth. Therefore, the signs
on the coefﬁcient of expenditure and revenue decentralization, taking into account the average
levels of revenue and expenditure share, should indicate whether convergence or divergence of
revenue and expenditure decentralization promotes growth.
Two tax variables are employed to examine the effects of distortion of taxes imposed by
central and provincial governments. Tax rates are used as aggregate measures of distortion
introduced by governments to ﬁnance their spending (Zhang & Zou, 1998). Speciﬁcally, the
central tax rate, measured by central tax revenues as a percentage of total GDP, is used to capture
the effect of distortion at the national level. The provincial tax rate, measured by provincial
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distortion at the provincial level. It is expected that the higher the tax rate, the more the economy
is distorted by the ﬁscal system (Barro, 1990).
While our main interest is the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and economic
growth, we must acknowledge that economic growth is subject to many inﬂuences beyond ﬁscal
decentralization. In order to control for these inﬂuences we introduce a set of control variables to
improve the robustness of the result. This set of control variables is consistent with the set of
variables used in Zhang and Zou’s (1998) case study of China, allowing their results to be
compared to those presented in this study. The control variables used in this study includes:
Physical and human capital investments, respectively measured by (1) the sum of gross
investment (government and enterprises together) as a share in GDP at provincial level and (2)
the growth rate of the provincial labor force.
Another important determinant of growth is openness to international trade, which is
measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP at provincial level. It is conventional to
hypothesize a positive relation between openness and growth on grounds that international
competition improves resource allocation via exports and more advance technology from
industrial countries can be attained via imports (Feder, 1983 quoted in Zhang & Zou, 1998).
Finally, we allow for the potential effect of macroeconomic instability on economic growth,
using the lagged inﬂation rate at the provincial level as a proxy for this variable. Inﬂation can
have both a positive and negative effect on growth. The positive effect stems from the potential
for inﬂation to promote savings and investment, as agents shift from ﬁnancial wealth (money) to
real assets (capital) to avoid the deleterious effects of inﬂation on real money balances (the Tobin
portfolio-shift effect). On the other hand, inﬂation may dampen economic growth because it
raises the transaction cost of economic activities (Zhang & Zou, 1998).
Data sources.Thepre-1990 data are taken from Hseh, Li,and Liu(1993).
6The post 1989 data
for the 30 provinces
7 are from the China Finance Statistical Yearbook (various issues) and the
China Statistical Yearbook (various issues). The panel datasets for thirty provinces cover 1979–
1993 and 1994–1999 separately (using the same methodology for these two time periods).
A statistical summary of the key variables. Table 1 provides the statistics of annual budgetary
expenditure and revenue shares in total government budgetary items across all provinces.
As indicated in Table 1, revenue is more decentralized than expenditure in every year.
8 The
differencebetweentheexpenditureandrevenueshareswastheprovincialremittancetotheCenter.
After introducing the ﬁscal contract system in 1980, the degree of revenue decentralization
(averagedprovincialrevenuecollectionshareintotalgovernmentrevenue)decreasedfrom2.6%in
1980 to 2.0% in 1985 while the degree of expenditure decentralization (averaged provincial
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6 Hseh, Tien-tung, Li, Qiang, and Liu, Shucheng (Eds.), 1993. China’s Provincial Statistics 1949–89. Boulder:
Westview Press.
7 Chongqing became a direct municipal city in 1997. Since it is hard to disaggregate the statistics of Chongqing from
that of Sichuan province before 1997, Chongqing’s statistics are added back to that of Sichuan for the years after 1997.
8 Since the statistics in Table 1 are the means of each province’s revenue and expenditure share in total. The mean
discrepancy between revenue (2.4%) and expenditure decentralization (1.9%) therefore represents the share of a single
province’s revenue/expenditure in total government revenue/expenditure. To acquire an idea of the discrepancy between
revenueandexpendituredecentralizationbetweencentralandprovincialgovernments aggregated,thestatisticsin Table1
should be multiplied by 29, which is the number of provinces (Tibet was dropped). For example, the discrepancy of
revenue and expenditure decentralization between the Center and provincial level of government is average at
(2.4   1.9)   29 = 14.5%.expenditure share in total government expenditure) increased from 1.6% in 1980 to 1.9% in 1985.
As a result, the gap between the average expenditure decentralization (across provinces) and
revenue decentralization gradually narrowed.
After 1985, expenditure decentralization varied between 2.0 and 2.2% while revenue
decentralization also started to increase from 2.0% in 1985 to 2.6% in 1993. As a result, the gap
between revenue and expenditure assignments at provincial level steadily widened.
The relativechange betweenexpenditure and revenue decentralization across the ﬁrst phase is
also captured in Fig. 1.
In addition, the coefﬁcients of variation of expenditure decentralization increased slightly
from around 0.41 in the ﬁrst half of 1980s to 0.58 in 1993 (Table 1 and Fig. 1). At the same time,
thecoefﬁcientsofvariationofrevenuedecentralizationdecreaseddramaticallyfrom1.15in1981
to 0.61 in 1991 and then increased slightly to 0.72 in 1993. In other words, the degree of revenue
decentralization across provinces converged through the 1980s. Such a convergence, in the
context of a decreased revenue decentralization level (mean across provinces, as show by the
decreasing mean statistic of the annual revenue decentralization across provinces shown in
Fig. 1) in the ﬁrst half of 1980s, indicates that the relatively wealthier provinces, with their lever
of controlling tax collection, relaxed their revenue collections (to avoid sharing with the Center),
hence their revenue decentralization level converged to the lower levels of the poorer ones.
9
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Table 1
Fiscal decentralization by year (1979–1993)
Expenditure decentralization by year (1979–1993) Revenue decentralization by year (1979–1993)
Year Obs
a Mean S.D. Min Max Coefﬁcient
of variation
Year Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Coefﬁcient
of variation
1979 29 1.7 0.7 0.1 2.9 0.41 1979 29 2.7 3.0 0.1 15.1 1.09
1980 29 1.6 0.7 0.2 2.8 0.41 1980 29 2.6 3.0 0.1 15.1 1.14
1981 29 1.6 0.6 0.2 2.7 0.39 1981 29 2.5 2.9 0.1 14.8 1.15
1982 29 1.7 0.7 0.2 2.8 0.38 1982 29 2.5 2.7 0.1 13.9 1.10
1983 29 1.7 0.6 0.2 2.8 0.37 1983 29 2.2 2.2 0.1 11.4 1.01
1984 29 1.8 0.7 0.3 3.1 0.36 1984 29 2.0 2.0 0.1 10.0 0.96
1985 29 1.9 0.8 0.2 3.5 0.40 1985 29 2.0 1.8 0.1 9.2 0.89
1986 29 2.0 0.8 0.3 3.8 0.42 1986 29 2.2 1.7 0.1 8.5 0.81
1987 29 2.0 0.9 0.3 3.7 0.43 1987 29 2.3 1.7 0.1 7.7 0.73
1988 29 2.1 0.9 0.3 4.3 0.45 1988 29 2.3 1.6 0.2 6.9 0.68
1989 29 2.2 1.0 0.5 4.6 0.47 1989 29 2.4 1.6 0.2 6.3 0.64
1990 29 2.1 1.0 0.4 4.4 0.47 1990 29 2.3 1.4 0.2 5.8 0.62
1991 29 2.2 1.1 0.5 4.8 0.49 1991 29 2.5 1.5 0.2 5.6 0.61
1992 29 2.0 1.0 0.4 5.0 0.50 1992 29 2.4 1.5 0.2 6.4 0.63
1993 29 2.2 1.2 0.4 6.3 0.58 1993 29 2.6 1.8 0.2 8.0 0.72
1.9 0.8 0.3 3.8 2.4 2.0 0.2 9.6
a Tibet is dropped due to unavailability of data.
9 The coefﬁcient of variation of revenue decentralization is the ratio of standard deviation of revenue decentralization
across provinces divided by the mean of cross-province revenue decentralization. As the mean statistic (in the
denominator) decreased before 1985, the standard deviation (in the numerator) decreased by more than the mean to
yield a decreasing coefﬁcient of variation. As such, the dispersion of revenue decentralization reduced signiﬁcantly—i.e.,
the high degree of revenue decentralization of better off provinces reduced and converged to the lower level of revenue
decentralization of poorer provinces.Furthermore,asnoted before, the difference betweenexpenditureandrevenuedecentralization is
the provincial remittance to the Center. It is shown by the difference between revenue
decentralization (white bars) and expenditure decentralization (darker bars) in Fig. 1.A s
demonstrated in Fig. 1, the provincial remittance to the Center (the excess part of white bars over
darker bars) gradually declined since the implementation of ﬁscal contracts as the excess part of
revenue over expenditure decentralization decreased.
From 1986 to 1991, the shares of provincial revenue in total government revenue further
converged across provinces as shown by the further decrease of coefﬁcient of variation of
revenue decentralization. Table 1 shows that this is a result of a further decline in standard
deviationofrevenuedecentralizationacrossprovincesatthetimewhenthemeanlevelofrevenue
decentralizationincreased.Sucha convergence canbea result ofeither(1)the revenuecollection
of poor provincesgrew faster than that of thewealthier provinces,or (2) the revenue collection of
wealthier provinces grew relatively slowly because the contract regime incited them to engage in
strategies that enabled them to accrue more of the revenue increments within their own
jurisdictions (For details, see Wong, 1991; Bahl & Wallich, 1992; and Bahl, 1999), or both.
The coefﬁcient of variation of revenue decentralization increased slightly in 1992 and sharply
in 1993. The increase in 1992 was a result of the reduced cross-province mean of revenue
decentralization (while the standard deviation was constant at 1991 level). The jump in 1993,
however, was a result of an increase in the mean and a larger increase of standard deviation of
revenue decentralization cross provinces. Such a change in 1993 was to a large extent a function
of the design of 1994 ﬁscal reform. More speciﬁcally, the compromised plan of 1994 ﬁscal
reform, under which provincial income level of 1994 was ensured by central ‘‘tax refund’’ up to
their 1993 level, stimulated a sudden inﬂation of provincial revenue collection. Provinces thus
attempted to boost the baseline of 1993 in order to entitle more ‘‘tax refund’’ from the Center in
1994 (for details, see Wang, 1997). Sincewealthier provinces now switched strategy from hiding
revenues to exhausting tax collections, this dramatically increased the dispersion in revenue
decentralization across provinces.
Table 2 provides the statistics of annual budgetary expenditure and revenue share (mean
across all provinces) in total government budgetary items during 1994–1999. Revenue
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Fig. 1. Budgetary expenditure and revenue decentralization (1979–1993).decentralization, which measured by the tax revenue collected at provincial level as a share in
total revenue, therefore largely reduced. Now the degree of revenue and expenditure
decentralization at the provincial level is reversed vis-a `-vis the ﬁrst phase of ﬁscal reform—
unlike in the ﬁrst phase, expenditure became more decentralized than revenue, with the average
cross-province shares stabilized around 2.4 and 1.6%, respectively (Table 2). The gap, instead of
representing provincial remittance to the Center, now reﬂects the Central transfer to the
provinces.
3.2. Methodology
First, the regression analysis in this study uses the panel data econometric technique. Panel
data sets combine time series and cross sections. They allow more ﬂexibility in modeling. Time
series data for each province in this cross-province regression analysis can better capture the
dynamics of the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and provincial economic growth.
Second, all coefﬁcients are estimated with ﬁxed-effects with corrections for panel
heteroskedasticity and panel serial correlation.
Using the panel data of 30 provinces, 1979–1993 and 1994–1999 separately, the following
model is employed to examine how ﬁscal decentralization affects provincial growth:
GDPgrowthi;t ¼ a0 þ a1 FDi;t þ a2 TAXi;t þ a3 POLITICALi;t þ a4 CONTROLi;t þ ei;t
where GDPgrowthi,t represents real GDP growth rate of province i at time t.F D i,t is a set of
vectors of ﬁscal decentralization measuring expenditure decentralization, revenue decentraliza-
tion (both further disaggregated into budgetary and extra-budgetary terms), and intergovern-
mental transfers when applied to the time period of 1994–1999. TAXi,t is a set of vectors
measuringthedistortingeffectsoftaxatbothcentralandprovinciallevel—centralandprovincial
tax rates.
CONTROLi,t is a set of variables that control for provincial investment, labor force growth
rate, the level of openness and provincial inﬂation (lagged).
4. Regression results
Table 3 reports the ﬁxed- and random-effect results of how ﬁscal decentralization affected
provincialeconomicreformforthetimeperiod1979–1993.Table4reportstheﬁxedandrandom-
effect results for the time period 1994–1999.
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Table 2
Fiscal decentralization by year (1994–1999)
Expenditure decentralization by year (1994–1999) Revenue decentralization by year (1994–1999)
Year Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Coefﬁcient
of variation
Year Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Coefﬁcient
of variation
1994 29 2.4 1.4 0.3 7.2 1.52 1994 29 1.5 1.2 0.1 5.7 0.76
1995 30 2.4 1.5 0.3 7.7 1.60 1995 30 1.6 1.2 0.1 6.1 0.76
1996 30 2.4 1.5 0.4 7.6 1.69 1996 30 1.7 1.3 0.0 6.5 0.78
1997 30 2.4 1.5 0.4 7.4 1.64 1997 30 1.6 1.3 0.0 6.3 0.79
1998 30 2.4 1.5 0.4 7.6 1.68 1998 30 1.7 1.3 0.0 6.5 0.80
1999 30 2.3 1.4 0.4 7.3 1.63 1999 30 1.6 1.4 0.0 6.7 0.83


























































































Provincial tax rate 0.02 (0.28)  0.12 ( 0.94)  0.21 ( 1.66)
*  0.04 ( 0.43)  0.04 ( 0.43)  0.33 ( 1.95)
*  0.24 ( 1.33)
Expenditure decentralization
(budgetary)
 2.89 ( 3.11)
***  3.63 ( 3.68)
***  5.53 ( 4.36)










 0.39 ( 0.28) 0.86 (0.61)  0.91 ( 0.47)
Revenue decentralization
(extra-budgetary)
 0.14 ( 0.13) 2.43 (1.35)





Investment rate 0.26 (4.60)
*** 0.22 (3.90)
*** 0.26 (4.64)
*** 0.09 (1.37) 0.10 (1.35) 0.15 (2.25)
** 0.11 (1.53)
Openness 0.09 (1.49)  7.97E 03 ( 0.14) 0.09 (1.41) 0.08 (1.07) 0.08 (1.04) 0.17 (2.32)
** 0.17 (2.28)
**
Provincial inﬂation (lagged) 2.85 (2.41)
** 2.62 (2.17)
** 2.48 (2.09)
** 1.16 (0.89) 1.18 (0.90) 0.71 (0.56) 0.70 (0.55)
Constant  2.04 ( 0.63)  4.94 ( 1.59)  0.57 ( 0.17)  1.36 ( 0.31)  1.81 ( 0.45) 4.07 (0.92) 4.26 (0.97)
Number of observations 383 383 383 303 303 303 303
Number of groups 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
R
2 within 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.194
R
2 between 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.004
R
2 overall 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.042
Note: The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Independent variables.
* Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.


















































































Central tax rate  1.10 ( 3.68)
***  1.06 ( 4.07)
***  1.43 ( 4.10)
***  1.40 ( 3.55)
***  1.32 ( 3.78)
***  1.03 ( 1.98)
*  0.97 ( 1.87)
*
Provincial tax rate 0.43 (1.26) 0.44 (1.44) 0.50 (1.25) 0.59 (1.33) 0.61 (1.51) 0.39 (0.92) 0.41 (0.97)
Expenditure decentralization
(budgetary)
 1.06 ( 1.00) 0.16 (0.13) 0.75 (0.58)  1.08 ( 0.90)  1.18 ( 0.98)
Revenue decentralization
(budgetary)
 0.51 ( 2.61)
***  0.36 ( 2.19)
**  0.33 ( 2.01)
**  0.49 ( 2.39)
**  0.49 ( 2.39)
**
Central transfer 0.01 (0.26) 0.00 ( 0.02)
Provincial remittance 0.06 (1.28)
Expenditure decentralization
(extra-budgetary)
 0.92 ( 1.26)
Revenue decentralization
(extra-budgetary)
 0.67 ( 1.01)
Labor growth rate 0.09 (1.45) 0.11 (1.74)




Investment rate 0.12 (2.74)
*** 0.12 (2.76)
*** 0.06 (1.23) 0.07 (1.42) 0.03 (0.69) 0.10 (1.81)
* 0.11 (1.84)
*
Openness 0.01 (0.58) 0.01 (0.70) 0.00 (0.18) 0.01 (0.29) 0.01 (0.28) 0.01 (0.54) 0.01 (0.53)
Provincial inﬂation (lagged)  2.27 ( 7.83)
***  2.27 ( 8.10)
***  1.59 ( 3.68)
***  1.77 ( 4.06)
***  1.47 ( 3.52)
***  2.01 ( 5.90)










Number of observations 167 167 139 139 139 139 139
Number of groups 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
R
2 within 0.5812 0.5987 0.6073 0.6251 0.631 0.5361 0.5335
R
2 between 0.0767 0.0261 0.0183 0.026 0.0465 0.1634 0.1612
R
2 overall 0.0737 0.1516 0.1965 0.1661 0.26 0.0003 0.0002
Note: The number in parentheses represents the t-statistic associated with each coefﬁcient.
a Independent variables.
* Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 10%.
** Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 5%.
*** Indicates a signiﬁcance level at 1%.4.1. First phase: 1979–1993
As Table 3 indicates, provincial economic growth is negatively associated with expenditure
decentralization and positively associated with revenue decentralization. That is, further
revenue decentralization and expenditure centralization promote growth. The negative
association between expenditure decentralization and provincial real GDP growth rate
contradicts the conventional wisdom of ﬁscal decentralization. It is, however, consistent with
Zhang and Zou’s (1998) result. Hence, their interpretation that ‘‘the central government may
be in a better position to undertake public investment with nation-wide externalities in the
early stages of economic development’’ is supported by this result. Second, the positive
association between revenue decentralization and provincial real GDP growth rate supports
the proponents of ﬁscal decentralization theories. In this casewhen revenue decentralization is
measured by revenue collected at provincial level, this result speciﬁcally suggests that
assigning more revenue collection to the sub-national levels leads to higher growth, because it
stimulates revenue mobilization from local sources and improve overall ﬁscal position (Shah,
1994). In addition, central tax rate has a signiﬁcant and consistent positive association with
provincial economic growth. This result is counter intuitive, but may be reconciled by the
observation that when central government revenue is low, countries are more prone to
macroeconomic instability, which may deter growth. (Ahamd, Gao, & Tanzi, 1995; Yusuf,
1994).
If instead of analyzing expenditure and revenue decentralization along, we compare the
results with the mean level of the degree of expenditure and revenue decentralization at
China’s provincial level, we reach rather different conclusions. Since in this phase, revenue is
already on average more decentralized than expenditure (2.4% versus 1.9%), further
decentralizing revenue and centralizing expenditure suggests a divergence of expenditure and
revenue at provincial level is growth promoting (because further revenue decentralization
means a higher share than 2.4% and further expenditure centralization means a lower share
than 1.9%, hence the divergence). Without changing the ﬁscal contract regime, and
assigning more revenue collection and less expenditure responsibilities to the provinces,
allowing more revenue to be remitted to the Center appears to promote provincial economic
growth.
In other words, provincial governments appear to be efﬁcient in collecting money, while the
central government appears to be more efﬁcient in spending it. With an institutional setting of
localized tax collection, the ﬁscal pattern suggested by the regression result, however, is
consistent with the implementation of a ﬁscal contract system between central and provincial
governments, under which the central government contracts tax collection out to its regional
agents and claim a proportion of total revenue collected.
The control variables perform in the regression very much as expected, with provincial
labor growth rate, investment rate, and openness all being positively associated with
provincial economic growth. The lagged provincial inﬂation level also exhibits a positive
association with provincial economic growth and the effect is statistically signiﬁcant at 5%
level when extra-budgetary expenditure and revenue share are absent from the equation
(Equations 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3). This is not a surprise for a transition economy like China,
which started its economic reform by liberalizing prices sector by sector. In addition, it may
also suggest that inﬂation has a positive effect on growth by spurring investment in physical
capital (Tobin portfolio-shift effect), overriding the negative effect of higher transaction costs
on growth.
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The overhaul of the ﬁscal contract system in 1994 substantially changed the relationship
between provincial economic growth and the degree of ﬁscal decentralization. Table 4 presents
the regression results testing the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and growth for the
period after 1994 when the tax assignment system was applied. Provincial economic growth rate
is shown to have no statistically signiﬁcant association with expenditure decentralization, and is
negatively (rather than positively) associated with revenue decentralization, with a high level of
consistency and statistical signiﬁcance.
There is no signiﬁcant association found between expenditure decentralization and provincial
economic growth. Unlike in the earlier phase, revenue centralization is found to be positively
associated with provincial economic growth, and the relationship is highly consistent and
statisticallysigniﬁcant(Table4).Giventhatrevenueisalreadymorecentralizedthanexpenditure
(averaged at 2.4% versus 1.6%) after the 1994 tax assignment reform,
10 further revenue
centralization suggests that a divergence of expenditure and revenue at provincial level – which
should have implied that more transfers from the Center to provinces – promotes growth. Central
transfers, however, are not found to be associated with higher growth in the regression results. A
possible explanation lies in the compromise made between the Center and provinces at the onset
of implementing tax assignment reform in 1994. That is, since the tax assignment reform would
surely largely reduce the revenue collection at the provincial level, wealthier provinces that
beneﬁted the most from the contract regime resisted to comply. The Center compromised: for
those provinces, whose own revenue would be reduced to lower than their 1993 level under the
new tax assignment system, were entitled to a ‘‘tax refund’’ from the central government at a
level that would ensure their revenues no lower than the 1993 level.
11 With an overwhelming
proportion of ‘‘tax refund’’ in central transfers that are actually not at the discretion of the Center
to serve macroeconomic stability, central transfers is found to have no signiﬁcant positive
association with provincial growth.
The control variables also performed as expected in the second phase. Provincial laborgrowth
rate and investment rate show a positive signs with economic growth, but the association is
weaker in both magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance than in the earlier period. It is perhaps not
surprising that physical inputs (investment and labor forcegrowth) played a more signiﬁcant role
intheearlyyearsofthetransition.However,asChinamovedintothe1990s,capitalaccumulation
may have led to diminishing returns. Openness, although still positively associated with
economic growth, is not a statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variable in the second era. A
possible explanation lies in the export VATrebate implemented since 1994. Since the rebate falls
solely on the central budget, provinces overstate exports in order to obtain more tax rebate. The
degree of openness, measured by the total of exports and imports as a percentage in provincial
GDP, may therefore be exaggerated.
Lagged provincial inﬂation, unlike in the ﬁrst phase, is negatively related with provin–
cial growth and the association is highly consistent and signiﬁcant (most of the times at 1%
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10 The split of central and subnational tax administration substantially increased revenue collected at central level and
reduced revenue collected at provincial level, and hence reduced provincial revenue share in total revenue from its
average level of 2.4% (1979–1993) to 1.7% (1994–1999). At the same time, expenditure were increasingly devolved to
subnational levels, hence the degree of expenditure decentralization (provincial expenditure share in total government
expenditure) increased from 1.9 in the (1979–1993) to 2.3 (1994–1999).
11 For details, see Wang (1997).level)—a sign of the overriding negative effect brought by the rise of transaction costs in the
1990s.
5. Summary and conclusion
This study attempts to examine how ﬁscal decentralization affected provincial economic
growth in China. In addition, it investigates how the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization
and provincial growth differed under the two different ﬁscal regimes that were adopted in China
since 1980.
The conventional wisdom that ﬁscal decentralization – revenue means should match
expenditure needs as close as possible at sub-national level – to improves allocative efﬁciency
and promote economic growth does not apply in the case of China. Using a panel data set for
China’s 30 provinces for the time period from 1979 to 1993 and 1994 to 1999 separately, the
results of this study suggest that in both time periods, expenditure and revenue decentralization
levels should further diverge to beneﬁt provincial growth.
For the revenue contract system (1979–1993), for example, tax collection was localized and
the provinces collected taxes on the Center’s behalf as its agents. Revenue decentralization, as
measured by tax collection at each province as a percentage in total revenue, was therefore much
more decentralized than expenditure because the provinces remitted a proportion (or a ﬁxed
amount plus a pre-determined growthrate) of the collected tax revenue to the Center and kept the
rest (for detail, see Ahmad et al., 1995; Bahl & Wallich, 1992; World Bank, 1993). As such, the
marginal budgetary revenue collection and marginal budgetary expenditure was highly
correlated, and therefore suggests that more revenue decentralization spurs tax collection and
allows for more spending (possibly by both central and provincial government) on investment
(Jin, Qian, & Weingast, 1999). While this explanation supports the notion that revenue
decentralization stimulates revenue mobilization from local sources (Shah, 1994), it also
suggests that expenditure centralization promotes growth because the central government spends
more efﬁciently than the provinces (Zhang & Zou, 1998).
The tax assignment reform in 1994 changed the tax administration with the establishment of
central tax bureaus to collect central and shared-taxes, and sub-national tax bureaus to collect
sub-national exclusive taxes. Revenue became more centralized than expenditure, with the
expendituregapsinprovincesbridgedbycentraltransferstotheprovinces.This isaﬁscal pattern
that is more comparable to other countries. The regression results suggest that at given level of
expenditure decentralization, more revenue centralization contributes to growth. This ﬁnding
supports the view that the Center is in a better position to allocate budgetary resources for
horizontal balance, macroeconomic stability, and investment in projects of national signiﬁcance.
This study adds to a growing body of evidence that under certain circumstances, ﬁscal
decentralization can be detrimental to economic growth (Steinfeld, 1999; Yang, 1997;
Young, 2000; Zhang & Zou, 1998). The results of this study also underscore the fundamental
proposition that institution matters. The effects of ﬁscal decentralization in any given case
depend critically on the nature of the ﬁscal institutions and political system in place.
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Table A.1
Fiscal decentralization by province (1979–1993)
Expenditure decentralization by province (1979–1993) Revenue decentralization by province (1979–1993)
Province Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Provinces Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
1 Beijing 15 1.7 0.2 1.2 2.0 Beijing 15 3.1 0.8 2.0 4.5
2 Tianjin 15 1.3 0.2 1.0 1.9 Tianjin 15 2.5 0.7 1.5 3.5
3 Hebei 15 2.4 0.2 2.1 2.9 Hebei 15 2.8 0.5 2.0 4.0
4 Shanxi 15 1.7 0.2 1.4 1.9 Shanxi 15 1.7 0.2 1.2 1.8
5 Neimeng 15 1.8 0.1 1.5 2.0 Neimeng 15 0.8 0.3 0.4 1.3
6 Liaoning 15 3.1 0.5 2.4 4.0 Liaoning 15 5.5 1.3 4.2 8.2
7 Jilin 15 1.8 0.3 1.4 2.3 Jilin 15 1.4 0.4 0.9 2.0
8 Heilongjiang 15 2.5 0.2 2.1 2.9 Heilongjiang 15 2.5 1.2 1.3 5.6
9 Shanghai 15 2.1 0.3 1.6 2.5 Shanghai 15 9.7 3.9 5.3 15.1
10 Jiangsu 15 2.7 0.3 2.1 3.1 Jiangsu 15 4.9 0.5 4.0 5.6
11 Zhejiang 15 2.0 0.4 1.4 2.5 Zhejiang 15 2.9 0.8 0.4 3.7
12 Anhui 15 1.7 0.2 1.4 2.1 Anhui 15 1.7 0.1 1.5 2.0
13 Fujian 15 1.6 0.3 1.2 2.2 Fujian 15 1.5 0.5 0.9 2.5
14 Jiangxi 15 1.5 0.1 1.3 1.6 Jiangxi 15 1.2 0.2 0.9 1.5
15 Shandong 15 3.0 0.5 2.3 3.7 Shandong 15 4.0 0.7 2.9 5.7
16 Henan 15 2.6 0.2 2.2 3.0 Henan 15 2.8 0.2 2.4 3.2
17 Hubei 15 2.4 0.2 2.1 2.7 Hubei 15 2.8 0.2 2.5 3.1
18 Hunan 15 2.2 0.2 1.9 2.5 Hunan 15 2.4 0.3 2.0 2.9
19 Guangdong 15 3.6 1.2 2.1 6.3 Guangdong 15 4.2 1.4 2.7 8.0
20 Guangxi 15 1.7 0.2 1.4 2.0 Guangxi 15 1.3 0.4 0.8 2.2
21 Hainan 15 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.7 Hainan 15 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7
22 Sichuan 15 3.4 0.6 2.7 4.3 Sichuan 15 3.5 0.6 2.7 4.7
23 Guizhou 15 1.3 0.1 1.0 1.5 Guizhou 15 0.9 0.3 0.5 1.4
24 Yunnan 15 2.2 0.6 1.4 3.8 Yunnan 15 1.9 1.1 1.0 4.7
25 Tibet 0 Tibet 0
26 Shaanxi 15 1.5 0.1 1.4 1.7 Shaanxi 15 1.3 0.2 0.9 1.7
27 Gansu 15 1.2 0.1 1.0 1.4 Gansu 15 1.1 0.3 0.8 1.8
28 Qinghai 15 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 Qinghai 15 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
29 Ningxia 15 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 Ningxia 15 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3
30 Xinjiang 15 1.4 0.1 1.2 1.6 Xinjiang 15 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.8
1.9 0.3 1.5 2.4 2.4 0.6 1.6 3.5
Table A.2
Fiscal decentralization by province (1994–1999)
Expenditure decentralization by province (1994–1999) Revenue decentralization by province (1994–1999)
Province Obs Mean S.D. Min Max Province Obs Mean S.D. Min Max
1 Beijing 6 2.4 0.4 1.7 2.7 Beijing 6 1.9 0.6 0.9 2.5
2 Tianjin 6 1.3 0.1 1.2 1.4 Tianjin 6 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.1
3 Hebei 6 2.8 0.1 2.7 2.9 Hebei 6 2.0 0.1 1.8 2.1
4 Shanxi 6 1.6 0.1 1.4 1.7 Shanxi 6 1.1 0.1 1.0 1.2
5 Neimeng 6 1.6 0.0 1.5 1.6 Neimeng 6 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.8
6 Liaoning 6 3.8 0.2 3.5 4.0 Liaoning 6 2.8 0.2 2.4 3.0References
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